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[30 ELR 10261] 
 
In the case of United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US-Shrimp),1 the 
Appellate Body of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT's) World Trade Organization (WTO)2 
declared that actions taken by the United States to protect endangered sea turtles were GATT-illegal. Despite 
the official U.S. welcome extended to this decision,3 the conclusions of the Appellate Body challenge the 
freedom of the United States to make significant foreign and domestic policy decisions. By ignoring and 
effectively overruling decisions made by the U.S. judiciary, on the very same issues of U.S. constitutional and 
administrative law that the Appellate Body chose to decide, the US-Shrimp case has made unprecedented 
inroads into the sovereignty of the United States, and the protection of the environment. Not surprisingly, a 
growing surge of criticism leveled at the outcome of this case contributed to the outrage vividly demonstrated 
in Seattle in December 1999. 
 
One result of the Seattle meeting is that the question of how the GATT/WTO may be reformed to incorporate 
environmental, human rights, and other goals is back on the agenda.4 The twisted tale of the US-Shrimp case 
demonstrates that the GATT/WTO is in urgent need of reform. Unfortunately, the Sysyphian task of reforming 
the GATT/WTO is a long and arduous undertaking in which the odds are heavily stacked against the reformers. 
While interstitial changes are tortuously negotiated in protracted sessions, the environment will continue to 
suffer at the hands of the GATT/WTO. In order to prevent this, it makes eminent sense for trade and 
environmental cases to be moved out of the GATT/WTO legal regime into more fair, open, and just tribunals. 
 
Part I of this Article reviews the facts of the US-Shrimp case and addresses a bizarre twist in this tale. The US-
Shrimp case is not a simple play with a single plot, in which a miscreant WTO thwarts the efforts of a virtuous 
United States to protect internationally endangered sea turtles. On the contrary, there is more than a whiff of 
suspicion that the United States equivocated over its decision to protect endangered sea turtles, and that it 
did not play the ethical role that it portrayed. Startlingly, the Appellate Body relied on an admission made by 
the United States in arriving at one of their reasons for holding against the United States on the crucial 
grounds of "arbitrary discrimination." During oral hearings the United States made damaging and incorrect 
admissions about the alleged absence of appeal and review procedures in the certification process of the U.S. 
statute in controversy, along with other statements that were relied upon by the Appellate Body in arriving at 
their finding of an absence of due process. Why the United States made these incorrect misstatements, and or 
dubious admissions, and thereby jeopardized its case eludes an easy answer. One possible explanation, 
although conjectural, is that the Clinton Administration abandoned sea turtles in order to further its broader 
international economic agenda. 
 
Such conduct would be consistent with the fact that the laws and policies of almost all national civil societies, 
and particularly the United States, reflect some form of interest in group politics.5 Lawmakers commit their 
countries to a variety of different and sometimes conflicting goals, objectives and programs that deal, for 
example, with health, communications, welfare, transport, human rights, trade, and environmental 
protection. The separate regimes establishing international free trade and environmental protection are well-
established potential sources of conflict. The United States is party to many cases in GATT/WTO legal [30 ELR 
10262] forums6 arguing for free trade, and may have found it necessary to sacrifice sea turtles in order to 
further more important economic objectives. 
 
Whether or not this is correct, what is clear, as Part II will demonstrate, is that GATT/WTO tribunals are ill-
suited to deal with questions of environmental protection. The embryonic legal system prevailing in 
international society lacks compulsory judicial settlement, and there is little doubt that the GATT/WTO, which 
possesses a system of compulsory and binding dispute settlement, endeavors to overcome this weakness by 
bringing all trade-related disputes under its jurisprudential canopy. Their treaty mandate, however, shackles 
them to GATT/WTO law, and excludes all other areas of law including international environmental law (IEL). 
Not surprisingly, the decision in the US-Shrimp case is just the most recent in a string of decisions by the 
GATT/WTO striking down efforts by the United States to protect the international environment.7 
 
Part II will also contend that the US-Shrimp case ignored IEL, while encouraging the kind of false admissions 
made by the United States. It reiterates the call for finding a more fair and just tribunal, such as those set up 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),8 possessed of jurisdiction to adjudicate 
both international trade and environmental law. 
 




The facts about sea turtles killed by shrimp trawling are well documented and generally uncontested. Shrimp 
trawling is recognized as the most wasteful commercial fishery in the world.9 In the Gulf of Mexico alone, 
shrimpers kill and waste approximately 2.5 billion pounds of fish a year, of which 70 percent would have been 
commercially valuable upon further maturation.10 Among the by catch are sea turtles, the estimated yearly 
loss worldwide being 100,000 turtles.11 These sea turtles represent a unique and vital part of the biodiversity 
of the ocean and may even be categorized as indicator species.12 Their mortality presents a grave and present 
danger to their existence.13 
 
The reason for anxiety over the possible extinction of sea turtles arises from the fact that they are late 
breeders. There is a high mortality rate of sea turtles before they reach breeding age due to natural 
conditions.14 The study of the effects on protection of eggs and hatchlings have demonstrated that these 
efforts alone do not lead to significant increases in population.15 Thus, the continued survival of juvenile, sub-
adult, and adult sea turtles that have matured past the hatchling stage is important to the survival of the 
various species.16 In order to protect these age groups of sea turtles from destructive shrimp trawling 
practices, turtle excluder devices (TEDs)17 were developed and have proven to be the soundest and most 
effective method available for protection.18 
 
There are six species of turtles present in U.S. waters that are protected by the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).19 The Olive Ridley, Loggerhead, and Green turtles are classified as "threatened," and the Hawksbill, 
Kemp Ridley, and Leatherback are listed as "endangered."20 The actions of the United States to protect sea 
turtles are based on solid, generally uncontested, scientific data. In addition to numerous other studies,21 the 
U.S. Congress in 1988 passed amending legislation to the ESA that directed the Secretary of Commerce to 
contract with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for a definitive report on the plight and conservation of 
sea turtles.22 In 1990, the NAS report on the Conservation of Sea Turtles found that shrimp trawling was 
responsible for more sea turtle mortality than all other human activities combined and concluded that the use 
of TEDs is vital to control the mortality of these endangered species.23 Furthermore, there was strong 
evidence that these turtles were migratory global species that were not confined to the waters of the United 
States and the outlying Caribbean areas. Pursuant to these studies, in § 609 of the 1989 U.S. Departments of 
Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill, the U.S. Congress added a legislative note to ESA § 8 entitled 
"Conservation of Sea Turtles: Importation of Shrimp" (Section 609),24 which directed that the protection of 
these endangered [30 ELR 10263] turtles be extended on a worldwide basis. Toward this objective Section 609 
required that two major procedural or implementing steps be taken. First, it called upon the U.S. Secretary of 
State to initiate bilateral and multilateral negotiations with foreign countries with a view to protecting sea 
turtles.25 Second, it banned the importation of wild shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology and 
established a certification procedure. No shrimp would be allowed into the United States unless the President 
certified annually that the nation concerned employed a regulatory program comparable to the United States 
and that the average rate of incidental takings of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting was 
comparable to that of the United States, or that the harvesting techniques of a nation do not pose a threat of 
incidental takings of sea turtles.26 
 
The certification requirements were challenged by complainants India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand.27 
They argued that the U.S. restrictions on the importation of shrimp violated Articles I:1, XI:1, and XIII:1 of GATT 
1994.28 In addition, the complainants argued that Section 609 did not qualify under the exceptions of Article 
XX(b) or XX(g) of GATT 199429 and that Section 609 and its implementing measures "nullified or impaired 
benefits" accruing to the complainants within the meaning of Article XXIII:1(a) of GATT 1994.30 Both the Panel 
and the Appellate Body, though for different reasons, held that the attempt of the United States to protect 
endangered sea turtles by restricting imports from countries that did not use TEDs was GATT-illegal. The 
Appellate Body upheld the Panel's report finding the U.S. action to be inconsistent with Article XI of GATT 
1994, but concluded specifically the action of the United States amounted to "unjustified discrimination" and 
"arbitrary discrimination" under the chapeau (introductory or preambular provision) to Article XX of GATT 
1994.31 
 
B. Applicable Law 
 
Before analyzing the decision of the Appellate Body it is necessary to sketch four fundamental aspects of the 
law that have been misconstrued, or not discussed at all in the order of the Appellate Body. They relate to the 
legal and constitutional status of the GATT/WTO as an international entity, the extent to which treaty 
negotiations are an integral and critical component of state sovereignty, the need for international tribunals to 
exercise judicial deference, and the decisions of U.S. courts on the very same issues addressed by the 
Appellate Body. 
 
1. The Limited Powers of the WTO 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the WTO is an international and not a supranational organization. The term 
"supranational" typically refers to an international organization that is empowered to exercise directly some 
of the functions otherwise reserved to international States (States).32 A major distinguishing feature between 
supranational and international organizations is the greater transfer of or limitation on the State sovereignty 
involved in the establishment of a supranational organization.33 The European Union (EU) is a paradigmatic 
example of a supranational organization.34 
 
The treaties establishing the GATT/WTO are limited agreements between sovereign States that prevent or 
control the parties from engaging in protectionist policies.35 The sovereignty or freedom of States otherwise 
to behave freely is left untouched except to the extent that members may have bound themselves or 
conferred specific powers upon the WTO to do so. The status of the WTO as an international, as distinct from 
a supranational organization, is buttressed by the fact that the agreement creating the WTO, and the various 
other covered agreements, do not set up a supranational or quasi-constitutional authority that is empowered 
directly to exercise the powers that are reserved to States.36 Because it is an international, not a 
supranational organization, there are no national measures that concede sovereignty to the WTO. Moreover, 
unlike supranational organizations such as the EU, GATT/WTO tribunals clearly lack jurisdiction involving 
private parties, and suits are limited to inter-state litigation. Furthermore, the decisions of GATT/WTO Panels 
and the Appellate Body can remain unadopted by consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).37 
 
GATT/WTO treaties are subject to the international law rules of ratification, and are to be interpreted "in 
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international [30 ELR 10264] law."38 This 
means that they are subject to "Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
parties."39 These rules of international law must include those created by other treaties, custom, and general 
principles of law40 unless they are excluded by the agreements themselves. 
 
2. Treaty Negotiations 
 
Within the international legal system, the limited powers of an international organization such as the 
GATT/WTO are juxtaposed with the more extensive powers of sovereign States, and "the type of international 
cooperation undertaken by an organization and its constituent treaty will normally leave the reserved domain 
of domestic jurisdiction untouched."41 
 
The rules of international law make abundantly clear that the exercise of treaty making power is one of the 
essential attributes of sovereignty and independence. Thus, a State's capacity of entering into relations with 
other States, of its own free will, has been stressed by many jurists as the decisive criterion of statehood.42 
The Permanent Court of International Justice in the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.)43 case concluded that 
restrictions on the independence of States cannot be presumed.44 A corollary of the independence of States 
is the duty of other States or international organizations to refrain from interfering with the treaty making 
power of States.45 Any interference or intrusion into this "reserved domain" must be based on a specific and 
definite conferral of power on the international organization.46 If there is no conferral of power to the 
international organization, the State in exercising its treaty making power must be independent of legal orders 
from other States or agencies.47 
 
Moreover, this also means that a State is not answerable to another State or international organization on 
how it should conduct its foreign policy. That is a matter within the reserve domain of a State unless there is 
an explicit yielding of this power.48 Even where this has happened, the international organization must be 
very sensitive about the manner in which it balances and draws the line of equilibrium between the sovereign 
rights of a State and the limited competence of the organization.49 
 
3. Judicial Deference 
 
Even where international tribunals are possessed of jurisdiction to review or overrule such decisions, it is 
important for international tribunals to recognize that the vertical command and control power structure 
governing politics and law within nations is conspicuously absent within the international legal order. In 
international society, power and authority rests on a horizontal base made up of sovereign [30 ELR 10265] 
States.50 This horizontal nature of international law requires international tribunals to respect national 
sovereignty and give substantial deference to findings of fact and interpretations of law by national courts.51 
This principle is echoed in Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.52 In essence, it directs the panel to give deference to the facts and the 
law as found by national tribunals. As to facts it states: "If the establishment of facts was proper and the 
evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the 
evaluation shall not be overturned. . . ."53 In dealing with the law, it states: 
 
    (ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with the customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the 
Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure 
to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.54 
 
By Ministerial Decision taken at the final Ministerial Conference of the Uruguay Round at Marrakesh, 
Morocco, in April 1994, it was decided that this standard of review under Article 17(6) would be reviewed 
after three years with a view to considering the question of whether it is capable of general application.55 This 
has not happened but other provisions of the GATT treaty are even more relevant. 
 
Illustrative of this relevance is Article X of GATT 1994. It provides for the setting up of special courts and 
tribunals 
 
    for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs 
matters. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative 
enforcement and their decisions shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies 
unless an appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of superior jurisdiction within the time prescribed for 
appeals to be lodged by importers . . . .56 
 
Thus, if a special court has been set up for customs matters, Article X:3(b) of GATT 1994 appears to be stating 
that in the absence of appeals therefrom, the decisions of that court are determinative of the issues and shall 
govern the question at issue. If this interpretation is correct, the deference demanded is even greater than has 
hitherto been contended. 
 
Even Croley and Jackson, who argue that the GATT/WTO is more of a supranational organization than appears 
to be the case, agree on the need for at least some deference to national bodies that are more representative 
of the popular will than the unelected GATT/WTO. They call for a balance between sovereignty on the one 
hand and the broader interest in realizing the gains of international coordination on the other.57 In the least, 
this means that a "line of equilibrium," similar to that drawn by the Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case 
between the rule of free trade and the exceptions under Article XX of GATT 1994,58 must be drawn between 
the foundational rule of State sovereignty under public international law and the narrow exceptions created 
by GATT. 
 
4. Decisions of U.S. Courts 
 
The protection of sea turtles has spawned a shoal of U.S. cases,59 of which two decisions are of particular 
relevance. These two decisions have taken a totally different view on the pertinent issues raised before the 
WTO and the conclusions on those issues adopted by the Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case. The first case 
concerns the attempt of an environmental group to secure an injunction ordering the Secretary of State to 
negotiate treaties.60 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that those parts of Section 609 
directing the Secretary of State to initiate treaty negotiations violated the separation of powers under the U.S. 
Constitution by infringing upon the President's exclusive power to negotiate with foreign governments and 
could not be enforced.61 
 
The same case also decided that the Court of International Trade (CIT) possessed exclusive jurisdiction with 
regard to the certification procedures of Section 609.62 Notwithstanding such a finding, the Secretary of State 
attempted to argue in the subsequent case of Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,63 that his actions 
pertaining to certification were not subject to judicial review. The CIT's decision rejected this contention, 
holding that the certification procedures could be reviewed both under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)64 and the citizen suit provisions of the ESA. 
 
[30 ELR 10266] 
 
C. The Conclusions of the Appellate Body 
 
The Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case concluded that the "United States measure, while qualifying for 
provisional justification under Article XX(g), fails to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX, and, 
therefore, is not justified under Article XX of the GATT 1994."65 The exception in paragraph (g), referred to, 
allows for restrictions that "relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. . . ."66 The chapeau 
provides that: 
 
    Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures.67 
 
The Appellate Body held that the actions of the United States amounted to both unjustifiable and arbitrary 
discrimination.68 
 
In arriving at their findings of "unjustifiable discrimination," one of the grounds upon which the Appellate 
Body relied was Section 609(a), which directs the Secretary of State to negotiate treaties for the protection of 
sea turtles. The Appellate Body determined that the United States had failed to engage "in serious, across-the-
board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and 
conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import prohibition against . . . shrimp. . . ."69 According to 
the Appellate Body, apart from the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles, the United States did not make "any serious, substantial efforts to carry out these express directions 
of Congress."70 Instead, the United States had acted in a discriminatory and unjustifiable manner by 
negotiating seriously with some but not all GATT members (including the appellees) who exported shrimp to 
the United States.71 The United States unsuccessfully argued that it had tried in good faith to enter into 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations to protect sea turtles and had succeeded in doing so with 19 other 
countries but not the complainants in this case. The United States additionally contended that it had 
successfully negotiated the Inter-American Convention on the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles in 
1996 and proposed to other Asian nations, including the complainants, that they should also enter into 
multilateral negotiations, but were turned down by the complainants.72 Moreover, the United States had 
transferred TED technology to over 30 developing countries, including many in Asia, prior to the imposition of 
the ban.73 
 
Although these contentions were argued before the Panel, it held that the negotiating efforts of the United 
States merely consisted of an exchange of documents, and that the United States did not enter into 
negotiations before it imposed certification requirements.74 The Appellate Body agreed with this finding of 
the Panel and by holding the importation ban of Section 609 constituted "unjustifiable discrimination,"75 
relied upon the inadequate negotiating efforts of the United States as a contributing factor.76 
 
The Appellate Body also held that Section 609 was applied in a manner constituting "arbitrary discrimination" 
under the chapeau to Article XX of GATT 1994 because the certification procedures under Section 609(b)(2) 
were not "transparent" or "predictable."77 According to the Appellate Body the Section 609's procedures 
consist principally of "administrative ex parte inquiry," with no formal opportunity for an applicant country to 
be heard, or to respond to any arguments that may be made against it.78 No formal written, reasoned, 
decision is rendered. While a list of approved applications are published in the Federal Register, they are not 
notified specifically. Countries whose applications are denied are omitted from the list but receive no formal 
notification. Finally, "no procedure of, or appeal from, a denial of an application is provided."79 In the view of 
the Appellate Body, there was no way for members to be certain that the terms of Section 609 and the 
administrative guidelines were being applied "in a fair and just manner."80 They concluded that there was a 
lack of due process in violation of Article X:3 of GATT 1994 that amounted to "arbitrary discrimination."81 
 
D. The Flawed Character of the Appellate Body Decision 
 
The considerations criticized in this Article were not the only ones offered by the Appellate Body for arriving at 
their [30 ELR 10267] decision that the U.S. actions amounted to unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination.82 
Consequently, a preliminary question that requires examination is the extent to which demonstrably, albeit 
partially, flawed reasoning taints the entirety of an international judicial order. 
 
The authority and persuasiveness of any international order depends on the extent to which it can offer good 
and convincing reasons for the conclusions it reaches. The persuasive power of an opinion "must depend very 
largely on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported."83 The reasoning adopted by an opinion 
supports and justifies its order, and the quality of this reasoning is an important factor that facilitates the 
acceptance, and enhances the authority, of international judicial decisions.84 
 
If the Appellate Body chooses to rely on more than one reason for its conclusion, then each one of these 
reasons becomes an integral part of the material law and facts providing the doctrinal justification of that 
order. None of the reasons can be severed or cherry picked from the judgment. Where, therefore, the 
Appellate Body gives a number of reasons for its decision, all of them form part of the interlinked chain of 
reasoning that cannot be dismembered. Thus, it is not possible to sever or separate the bad reasons from the 
good, and rely only on the good while discarding the bad. 
 
The judicial system of the WTO is not governed by stare decisis or the doctrine of binding precedent. 
Nonetheless, as judicial bodies, WTO tribunals first determine the material facts85 and create doctrines86 that 
provide the reasoned justification for the case being decided. The doctrines, rules, or conclusions arrived at in 
deciding a case may serve as persuasive, albeit nonbinding, precedents in subsequent cases. In the US-Shrimp 
case the Appellate Body chose to rely, at least partially, on demonstrably erroneous and flawed reasons for 
concluding that the application of Section 609 amounted to both "unjustifiable" and "arbitrary" discrimination. 
The infirmity of these reasons renders their conclusions on both standards unsupportable. 
 
1. Unjustifiable Discrimination 
 
There are at least three obvious problems with the Appellate Body's decision that the absence of diligent 
treaty negotiation by the United States amounted to "unjustifiable discrimination." First, it constitutes a 
violation of the principle of state sovereignty by attempting to second-guess the manner in which the United 
States should have conducted treaty negotiations. As we have seen, States possess the freedom to negotiate 
treaties as they deem proper. This is an essential attribute of sovereignty that gives rise to the corollary duty 
of other States or international organizations not to interfere with this power. This is precisely what the 
Appellate Body did. It entered into the reserved domain of the United States and passed judgment on the 
manner in which the United States had exercised this right. 
 
Second, Section 609, which must be read a part of the ESA, does require the Secretary of State to negotiate 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, we have noted that the Ninth Circuit has ruled that this 
requirement violated the separation of powers within the constitution and that such directions are illegal and 
unenforceable. The Appellate Body's conclusion that the Secretary of State did not make "any serious and 
substantial efforts to carry out these express directions of Congress" ignores the unconstitutionality of that 
provision, and effectively overrules a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals.87 There is nothing in the 
GATT/WTO or its covered agreements conferring such powers on it. 
 
Third, even if the GATT/WTO did possess the power to interfere with the sovereign decisions of States, their 
finding of "unjustifiable discrimination" also ignored the need to give substantial deference to the fact that the 
United States had tried to negotiate treaties and had in fact succeeded in doing so with 14 other nations. 
Croley and Jackson, although arguing that the GATT/WTO is something of a supranational organization, call for 
a balance between sovereignty on the one hand and the broader interest in realizing the gains of international 
coordination on the other.88 
 
In the US-Shrimp case the Appellate Body labored strenuously to draw a "line of equilibrium" between the rule 
of free trade and nondiscrimination created by the GATT on the one hand, and the exceptions under Article XX 
on the other.89 The Appellate Body reasoned that their interpretation of the chapeau was an exercise in such 
equilibrium line drawing. Having held that the actions of the United States fell within the exceptions to Article 
XX, they struck down the U.S. certification program on the basis that the U.S. action amounted to 
"unjustifiable discrimination." On a parity of reasoning, they also should have balanced the sover-eignty of a 
State, with special reference to the reserved domain of treaty making and deference on the one hand, with 
the limited powers conferred upon the GATT/WTO on the other. Their decision to draw just one line of 
equilibrium, without any mention or even awareness of their need to draw another, amounts to undisguised 
trespass into the reserved domain of States. 
 
2. Arbitrary Discrimination 
 
The Appellate Body's decision that the certification program lacked procedures for review and appeal flies in 
the face of the express decision of the CIT. A similar argument was raised in the CIT, and its June 1995 decision 
held that the certification decision could be reviewed both under the APA as well as the ESA.90 As we have 
seen, the CIT is a special court set up for customs matters and Article X:3(b) of [30 ELR 10268] GATT 1994 
appears to be stating that in the absence of appeals therefrom, the decisions of the CIT are determinative of 
the issues and shall govern the question at issue. If this interpretation is correct, the deference demanded is 
even greater than has hitherto been contended. Since the CIT possesses exclusive jurisdiction over the 
certification issues of Section 609,91 and it has ruled that certification procedures are reviewable under both 
the APA and ESA, absent an appeal from such a decision, Article X:3(b) obligates GATT tribunals to be bound 
by such a ruling. 
 
If anything, it is arbitrary and capricious for an international tribunal such as the Appellate Body, plainly 
untutored in American administrative law, to make the startling claim that the U.S. administrative process is 
lacking in elementary rules of administrative justice and that there is no review under U.S. law of a substantive 
administrative decision involving an entitlement such as the certification created by Section 609. The various 
Department of State guidelines implementing the certification program of Section 609 did state that the 
procedures were not subject to the notice comment and delayed effectiveness provisions of the APA,92 but 
this did not in any way affect the ability of an aggrieved party, such as one of the complainants, from 
challenging the final order under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, on grounds, inter alia, that it was conducted without 
observance of procedure required by law.93 The APA has also specifically waived sovereign immunity for this 
kind of action.94 
 
This question of entitlement to judicial review of Section 609's certification procedure is resolved implicitly in 
the decision of the Ninth Circuit, which did not recognize any obstacle to the CIT's jurisdiction over issues 
arising under Section 609(b)'s importation ban for nations that fail to meet the certification requirements.95 
The question is also easily answered by a glance at provisions of the APA. The APA, in 5 U.S.C. § 701, permits 
actions of "each authority of the Government of the United States" to be subject to judicial review unless 
there is a statutory prohibition on review or the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."96 
In this case, there is no indication that judicial review of Section 609 is foreclosed because of statutory 
language. Nor is there any "showing of 'clear and convincing' evidence of a . . . legislative intent"97 to 
foreclose access to judicial review.98 Furthermore, Section 609(b) procedures do not fall within the exception 
for action "committed to agency discretion." This exception has been construed narrowly and the legislative 
history of the APA shows that it is applicable only in cases where statutes have been drawn so broadly that 
there is no law to apply.99 
 
In light of the availability of judicial review of Section 609(b), it should be noted that Article X of GATT 1994, 
dealing with the publication and administration of trade regulations, stipulates the most minimal procedural 
safeguards. It requires only that the applicable laws and regulations be published,100 that "each contracting 
party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and 
rulings,"101 and that contracting parties "shall maintain, or institute . . . judicial, arbitral or administrative 
tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative 
action relating to customs matters."102 The APA thus more than satisfies these requirements. 
 
3. The Sting in the Tale 
 
At this stage we need to be appraised of the strange behavior of the United States. The Secretary of State, to 
whom the President delegated his power under Section 609, was not a willing party to a worldwide ban on the 
importation of turtle destroying shrimp. The Secretary initially limited its jurisdiction to countries in the wider 
Caribbean and western Atlantic regions. This decision was challenged by environmental groups and on 
December 29, 1995, the CIT ruled that Section 609 applied to all the oceans of the world, not merely the wider 
Caribbean, and that annual certification must apply to a nation as a whole, and not on a ship-by-ship basis.103 
 
The equivocation of the United States is starkly framed by the manner in which the Secretary attempted to 
circumvent this court order. The Administration first requested and was denied an extension of one year.104 
Undaunted, it then published revised guidelines105 (1996 Guidelines) permitting a declaration by the 
importer to take the place of the certification required by Section 609 of the Conservation of Sea Turtles 
Act.106 Such declarations by countries engaged in industrial fishing would have permitted imports on a [30 
ELR 10269] ship-by-ship basis, and eviscerated the objectives of Congress. Not surprisingly, these regulations 
were successfully challenged, for the second time, on the basis that they were not in conformity with the 
court's judgment.107 
 
There is little doubt that these errant regulations would have defeated the objectives of Section 609 for a 
number of reasons. First, by requiring TEDs only on those vessels that harvest shrimp for export to the United 
States, the 1996 Guidelines placed sea turtles at a greater risk of incidental capture by non-TED equipped 
boats. Second, it reduced incentives for countries to adopt comprehensive national programs, in which they 
equipped all their shrimp trawlers with TEDs, by opting instead for ship-by-ship and shipment-by-shipment 
authorization. Finally, it would be extremely difficult to verify whether or not imported shrimp alleged to be 
TED caught were in fact harvested in that manner. 
 
Despite these reasons, the Secretary appealed the order of the CIT, and the Federal Circuit vacated on a 
technicality that had nothing to do with the merits or substance of the case.108 The Administration then 
seized this technical victory to issue revised guidelines in August 1998109 (1998 Guidelines) which reinstated 
the 1996 Guidelines. On challenge has now held that these 1998 Guidelines also conformity with the language 
of Section 609.110 
 
At the same time that the misconceived 1998 Guidelines were issued, and were being supported by the U.S. 
government before Judge Aquilino of the CIT, the Administration was also defending its worldwide ban before 
the WTO panels. Facing both ways like Janus, they appeared in the words of Judge Aquilino to take "another 
attack"111 before the WTO. The Administration's brief and arguments before the Appellate Body gave the 
impression that it was serious about the protection of sea turtles112 This appearance, however, did not last 
long. What happend at the hearings before the Appellate Body provides a surprising, even bizarre, twist and 
sting to this tale.112 
 
In arriving at their conclusion that the conduct of the United States amounted to "arbitrary discrimination" the 
Appellate Body relied upon the following facts: 
 
    With respect to neither type of certification under Section 609(b)(2) there is a transparent, predictable 
certification process that is followed by the competent United States government officials. The certification 
processes under section 609 consist principally of administrative ex parte inquiry or verification by staff of the 
Office of Marine Conservation in the Department of State with staff of the United States National Marine 
Fisheries Service. With respect to both types of certification, there is no formal opportunity for an applicant to 
be heard, or to respond to any arguments that may be made against it, in the course of the certification 
process before a decision to grant or deny certification is made. Moreover, no formal written, reasoned 
decision whether of acceptance or rejection, is rendered on applications for either type of certification, 
whether under Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B) or under Section 609(b)(2)(C) . . . . No procedure for review of, or 
appeal from, a denial of an application is provided.113 
 
These conclusions of the Appellate Body referenced statements by the United States at the oral hearing.114 In 
particular, the Appellate Body's statement that "no procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an 
application is provided," relied on such a U.S. admission as its basis in fact.115 From this and other facts 
admitted by the United States, the Appellate Body arrived at the legal conclusion that "effectively, exporting 
Members applying for certification whose applications are rejected are denied basic fairness and due process, 
and are discriminated against, vis-a-vis those members which are granted certification."116 It then discussed 
Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 and went on to state: 
 
    The non-transparent and ex parte nature of the internal governmental procedures applied by the 
competent officials in the Office of Marine Conservation, the Department of State, and the United States 
National Marine Fisheries Service throughout the certification processes under section 609, as well as the fact 
that countries whose applications are denied do not receive formal notice of such denial, nor of the reasons 
for the denial, and the fact that there is no formal legal procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an 
application, are all contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994.117 
 
Thus, the U.S. admission at the oral hearing that there is no formal legal procedure for appeal or review played 
a critical part in the Appellate Body's decision that the actions of the United States amounted to "arbitrary 
discrimination." As previously discussed, this admission flies in the face of a U.S. federal court decision on the 
same issue.118 It also runs [30 ELR 10270] counter to the principles and rules of due process found both in the 
APA as well as the U.S. Constitution. 
 
If the United States did not mean to make such a damaging and errant admission it should have sought to 
correct the record. The United States did not such thing. On the contrary it welcomed119 and then scurried to 
comply with the order of the Appellate Body without any protest by issuing new regulations.120 The revised 
Department of State regulations concerning Section 609 seek to bring the United States into compliance with 
GATT law, but it will not be known until it is challenged again if a subsequent GATT Panel or Appellate Body 
Report will find these revised regulations GATT-legal. 
 
In the least, the admissions by the United States, along with the alacrity with which it welcomed the decision 
of the Appellate Body, cries out for public clarification. While such an explanation may or may not be 
forthcoming, it is evident that the US-Shrimp case serves the purpose of drawing attention to the failings of 
the GATT/WTO legal regime to deal fairly with questions involving IEL. It is imperative to move such disputes 
into a more satisfactory forum that can avoid the kind of suspicions surrounding the US-Shrimp case. 
 
Part II: Deciding International Trade and Environment Disputes 
 
A. A Fairer Judicial Forum Than GATT/WTO 
 
There is little doubt that the absence of compulsory judicial settlement is a serious weakness in the embryonic 
legal system prevailing in international society. The GATT/WTO, which possesses a unique system of 
compulsory and binding dispute settlement, endeavors to overcome this weakness by bringing all trade-
related disputes under its jurisprudential canopy. This system of compulsory dispute settlement could be seen 
as the jewel in the crown of free trade under which the world has enjoyed nearly half a century of unrivaled 
economic growth, prosperity, and comity following World War II. 
 
In contrast, IEL institutions121 are fragmented and lack the WTO's global authority, organizational structure, 
financial backing, and legal status. Many IEL legal forums, with the exception of UNCLOS, lack the international 
jurisdiction, authority, and implementing powers of the WTO.122 Because of their institutional and legal 
prominence, first GATT panels, and now the stronger DSB under the WTO, have emerged as the sole legal 
forum for resolving many disputes where the goals of environmental protection and free trade conflict. 
 
Environmentalists have reason to fear this assertion of jurisdiction by the GATT/WTO for a number of 
reasons.123 First, the substantive or constitutional law of the GATT/WTO ignores international law dealing 
with environmental protection, and treats any law or treaty not embodied in GATT or its "Covered 
Agreements," as irrelevant. The GATT/WTO is precluded from taking cognizance of international 
environmental laws, even though these laws constitute an important segment of international law. By 
contrast, UNCLOS Tribunals "shall apply . . . other rules of international law not incompatible with this 
Convention."124 This formulation is more receptive to international law, and less restrictive of non-UNCLOS 
law than the comparable provisions of the GATT/WTO that assiduously and systematically exclude all but 
GATT law. 
 
The law applied by the GATT/WTO is confined to that found in its own treaties and does not recognize any 
broader corpus of general international law, let alone IEL.125 Since environmental protection never was and is 
not a GATT/WTO objective, the GATT and its covered agreements do not deal with environmental protection 
apart from the exceptions found in Article XX of GATT 1994, and an exception in the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.126 It is abundantly clear that GATT/WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies must restrict 
themselves to Articles 16 and 17(14) of Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement—entitled Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)—and the Covered Agreements,127 [30 ELR 10271] 
which, moreover, should be interpreted and construed strictly in a way that does not add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided by the treaties.128 
 
UNCLOS, in contrast to the GATT, tries in various provisions to accommodate international law. The general 
provision dealing with its relation to other conventions,129 the non-derogation clause notwithstanding, tries 
to reconcile, and not repudiate, the rights and obligations arising from other agreements. Consequently, 
UNCLOS tribunals can take cognizance of GATT law, while their GATT counter-parts are unable to take 
cognizance of UNCLOS. 
 
Despite a rhetorical reference to environmental protection in the hortatory preamble of the WTO,130 
GATT/WTO treaties call for the advance of free trade effectively unrestrained by environmental constraints. 
Such an advancement of free trade, impervious to environmental concerns, apparently relied upon the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which posited that economic growth is a pre-condition to environmental 
protection. Such a view was adopted by an earlier report of the GATT Secretariat.131 The present Secretariat 
appears to have moved away from such a doctrinaire position, and suggested that the EKC may not follow an 
immutable path. They have conceded that competitive pressure may prevent the turn around of the pollution 
path, and that economic growth driven by trade liberalization may defeat the mechanisms that could generate 
an EKC.132 They also admit that economic growth is not sufficient for turning environmental damage around 
and that appropriate environmental and regulatory policies are necessary.133 Such a position appears to 
support the use of policies that promote environmental protection by way of trade measures. But turning its 
own logic on its head, the report asserts that the use of trade measures is fraught with risk for the multilateral 
trading system.134 The underlying premise of this conclusion is that trade sanctions must remain the 
monopoly of the GATT/WTO.135 While consistent with GATT/WTO treaties, which fail to recognize any other 
laws, such a position ignores the reality of an international legal system encompassing a much wider corpus of 
law including, inter alia, those protecting the environment and human rights. 
 
Second, the track record of GATT/WTO litigation demonstrates the extent to which international 
environmental protection has been diminished. GATT/WTO judicial bodies view IEL trade restrictions as 
obstructions to the painfully engineered legal regime created by the GATT/WTO aimed at liberalizing trade by 
eliminating controls and restrictions. In an apparently candid admission, the GATT Secretariat once conceded 
that it is reasonable for concerned countries to seek to change the actions and policies of others that damage 
the global environment,136 but the present Secretariat has recanted from this position, and the cases have 
been inconsistent in disallowing the use of trade restrictions that promote environmental protection. 
 
The primary avenue of overcoming GATT prohibitions against trade restrictions137 is by finding justification 
under Article XX of GATT 1994 and its chapeau. The chapeau provides that: 
 
    Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which could constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures. . . .138 
 
The most important exceptions, found in paragraphs (b) & (g), allow restrictive measures that: "(b) [are] 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . ," or "(g) relate to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption . . . ."139 
 
There is an extensive jurisprudence dealing with the nature and ambit of these exceptions140 which cannot 
be explored fully in this Article. Instead, this Article takes a functional look at the application of these 
exceptions in three previous cases that together offer a baseline for interpreting Article XX exceptions of GATT 
1994. They are United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (US-Tuna I),141 United States-Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna (US-Tuna [30 ELR 10272] II),142 and United States-Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline (US-Gasoline).143 The very narrow grounds on which these decisions justify 
environmental action do not provide a satisfactory basis for ensuring environmental protection. 
 
The GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report in US-Tuna I involved a case in which the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA)144 of the United States required the relevant authorities to ban the importation of 
yellow tuna that had been caught with nets that resulted in the killing of dolphins. After years of fruitless 
negotiation between the United States and Mexico to establish rules for dolphin mortality, the United States 
placed a total embargo on the importation of yellow tuna caught with dolphin-killing rather than dolphin-
friendly nets.145 The GATT Panel held that the U.S. ban violated the GATT and did not fall within the 
exceptions in Article XX (b), (d), or (g). 
 
Three years later, in US-Tuna II, the European Economic Community challenged the secondary embargo 
provisions of the MMPA that required any intermediary nation exporting yellow tuna to the United States to 
provide the relevant authorities with proof that such yellow tuna had not been caught with dolphin-killing 
nets.146 Once again the GATT Panel held against the United States. According to the Panel, such action was 
not "necessary" under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994, and was not "primarily aimed at" the conservation of 
natural resources under Article XX(g) of GATT 1994.147 
 
The report of the Appellate Body in US-Gasoline was an appeal from a WTO Dispute Panel that Venezuela and 
Brazil successfully called upon to review pollution standards for gasoline imposed by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act (CAA).148 The dispute revolved around whether domestic 
refiners were given an unfair and preferential advantage over foreign refiners in the formulation and setting of 
the standards.149 The Appellate Body ruled that the manner in which the United States determined the 1990 
baselines, and the consequent pollution standards for gasoline under the CAA, could not be justified under 
Article XX (b), (d), and (g) of GATT 1947.150 
 
In two of these three cases, the United States took action to protect the environment and did not argue that it 
was obliged to do so by treaty. In light of the apparently unilateral nature of the U.S. actions, a preliminary 
question is whether the GATT/WTO permits environmental action that has been authorized and mandated, 
though not obligated, by a multilateral treaty that did not include all GATT contractual parties.151 
 
This question was in fact addressed in US-Tuna II.152 The United States, while not claiming that its actions 
were obligated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES),153 did in fact offer treaty justification for its actions. It argued generally that its actions "were 
consistent with and directly furthered the objectives"154 of CITES and other environmental treaties, and more 
specifically, that they were authorized and empowered by CITES. According to the United States: 
 
    All species of dolphins involved in the fishery of the eastern tropical Pacific were listed in CITES Appendix II. 
Moreover, while the United States was not obliged under CITES to adopt the measures at issue, CITES 
specifically provided for these measures in providing for "stricter domestic measures" in order to further the 
objectives of that agreement. The Unites States' measures were stricter domestic measures, as explicitly 
contemplated under CITES, taken to protect species of dolphins that CITES protects. These measures were in 
addition to the restrictions on trade in specimens of the dolphins themselves that are required under CITES . . . 
.155 
 
Relying on CITES and other international environmental treaties, the United States contended that these 
treaties should, according to international law, be taken into account as general or special rules for 
interpreting Article XX of the GATT.156 Further, the United States argued that the actions taken by the parties 
to these multilateral environmental treaties constituted "subsequent practice" under general international 
law and Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. The Panel made short shrift of these arguments, asserting 
that the CITES and the other environmental treaties were not subsequent agreements signed by all the parties 
to the GATT. With regard to the use of IEL agreements in the interpretation [30 ELR 10273] or application of 
Article XX, the Panel bluntly declared that "they did not apply to the interpretation of the General Agreement 
or the application of its provisions."157 
 
The Panel, by so holding, was acting in conformity with GATT law and jurisprudence. The recognition that 
environmental treaties affect the interpretation or application of the GATT would require judicial law making 
that GATT/WTO panels are forbidden from undertaking.158 It would, in any case, be a mistake to argue that 
unilateral decisions are more difficult to justify than those based on multilateral treaties159 because there is 
no distinction made in the language of Article XX of GATT 1947 between treaty and nontreaty justification. 
 
There are other ways in which the GATT and the decisions of GATT/WTO tribunals can obstruct the 
implementation of environmental treaties. First, the word "necessary" (to protect human, animal, or plant life 
and health) in Article XX(b) of GATT 1994 has been restrictively interpreted160 to mean that a government 
must employ the measure that is the least GATT-inconsistent. Even where a measure is required to protect 
human, animal, or plant life or health, it may well be held to be "unnecessary" in the view of the GATT/WTO 
tribunal, if such tribunal determines that other measures, more consistent with GATT, were available. Import 
and export restrictions under CITES could well be struck down on the basis that they are not the least trade 
restricting measures available to the country concerned. 
 
Second, US-Tuna II interpreted "relating to" (the conservation of exhaustible natural resources) in Article XX(g) 
of GATT 1947 to allow extra-territorial conservation efforts that had been prohibited by US-Tuna I.161 
However, the Appellate Body in US-Gasoline reconfirmed the rule asserted in US-Tuna II that such policies 
should be primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,162 as determined by the 
GATT/WTO. This means that GATT/WTO tribunals can impugn any action taken under any IEL convention on 
the basis that the action is, in their view, not primarily aimed at conservation even if the concerned States 
assert a contrary view. 
 
Third, GATT/WTO tribunals have assumed a disturbing interventionist character. Oblivious of their appellate 
status, they seem eager to override the judgment of sovereign nations with which they disagree, and make 
their own decisions on the facts. They seem unaware of judicial restraint, the need for deference to the 
decisions of national fact-finding bodies, or standards of review that restrain an Appellate Body from 
interfering in an executive action unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.163 This is most 
clearly born out by the manner in which the Appellate Body sought to interfere with U.S. treaty making, and 
overrule decisions of the U.S. courts in the US-Shrimp case. 
 
Fourth, US-Tuna I reiterated the rule that Article XX of GATT 1947 could only be directed at products, not at 
process or production methods.164 It concluded that measures aimed at reducing dolphin killing were a 
production method and thus were not covered by Article XX(g) of GATT 1947. 
 
Finally, the Appellate Body in US-Gasoline created another formidable hurdle against GATT member States 
seeking to claim the environmental exemptions under Article XX of GATT 1994. It found that the burden 
placed on States that sought to come within Article XX was not confined to satisfying the narrow health, 
environment, and natural resource exemptions found within paragraphs (a) to (j). After doing so, they had to 
further prove that the measures taken did not violate the "chapeau" of Article XX that prohibit "arbitrary" or 
"unjustified" discrimination, or a "disguised restriction" of free trade. In holding that the United States had 
violated the chapeau,165 the Appellate Body demonstrated no hesitation in second-guessing the judgment 
and overruling decisions and rules made by the EPA, the executive or administrative agency that makes 
decisions affecting national environmental policy. In doing so, it showed scant regard for the ordinary and 
well-recognized principles of deference accorded to the primary decisionmaker. We have seen how the 
sovereignty of the United States was assailed in even more stark fashion by the Appellate Body in the US-
Shrimp case. 
 
Furthermore, the panelists who interpret such substantive trade law are unfamiliar with, if not unfriendly 
toward, laws and agreements directed at international environmental protection. To begin, the DSU defines 
who may serve as a panel member: 
 
    [30 ELR 10274] 
 
    Persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or of a 
contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement 
or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or 
served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.166 
 
It is striking that this list does not include anyone with qualifications outside the field of trade law, and 
automatically excludes anyone with expertise in international environmental law who does not also have the 
Article 8 qualifications. 
 
GATT/WTO panelists are prevented from engaging in the customary judicial role of interpreting and 
developing the law. This is because of the constraints imposed on panelists by Article 3(2) of the DSU. Article 
3(2) is an interesting provision that has all the hallmarks of an unresolved disagreement. It reiterates that the 
dispute settlement system should first, preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the Covered 
Agreements and second, clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law.167 Having stated this, it proceeds immediately to attenuate 
future interpretation by prohibiting any tribunal from adding to or diminishing rights and obligations provided 
in the Covered Agreements.168 This flies in the face of judicial law making and assumes a set of precise, tailor 
made, predetermined and inflexible rights and duties that can be mechanically dispensed without any judicial 
intervention.169 
 
Such an approach is untenable for a number of reasons. First, the DSU and the Covered Agreements were 
made by humans not gods, and cannot anticipate the multiplicity of contingencies and circumstance that 
could give rise to controversies about rights and duties. Second, the DSU and the Covered Agreements cannot 
anticipate the law that should be applied in every situation. Each set of rights and duties ought to be applied 
to the particular variegated fact situation; the scope of each right and duty could not possibly be ordained in 
advance. That is why international instruments are couched in various degrees of generality and 
indeterminacy.170 Third, duties and rights are correlative concepts,171 but they are "institutions" and tools of 
judicial reasoning for deriving and assigning benefits and burdens. It has persuasively been argued that 
institutional concepts consist of three sets of rules: (1) a set of constitutive rules specifying situations to which 
they might be applied, (2) a set of rules specifying the legal consequences, and (3) terminative rules specifying 
outcomes.172 Each step involves judicial analysis, reasoning, discretion, and power within a continuing time 
frame to ascertain the nature, scope, and applicability of indeterminate rights and duties. 
 
The DSU attenuates judicial discretion, or freedom, to adapt the law to new situations. It defies reality by 
assuming that an initial expression of law in a treaty freezes both time and content. In fact, any expression of 
law is intended to be applied to future events over an indefinite period of time during which its initial meaning 
is subject to change. 
 
The customary international rules of interpretation, restated in the Vienna Convention,173 assume there can 
be no omniscient expression of rights and obligations that can be applied automatically with dogmatic 
immutability. Instead, the Vienna Convention calls for any treaty to be interpreted according to its ordinary 
meaning in "context and in the light of its object and purpose."174 In addition to context, the Vienna 
Convention states that any applicable rules of international law should be taken into account.175 
 
The DSU has apparently rejected the Vienna Convention criteria by asserting that the rights and obligations set 
out in the Covered Agreements are sufficient for all purposes, and earlier references to rules of interpretation 
in the DSU must be understood as aspirational and cosmetic rather than obligatory. GATT/WTO's judicial 
system appears even more inward looking and blinkered when compared to International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
jurisprudence. ICJ decisions apply treaties, international custom, the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations, judicial decisions, and the teachings of the publicists.176 The law applied by the GATT/WTO 
is confined to its own agreements. 
 
B. Jurisdiction of UNCLOS in Trade and Environment Disputes 
 
In light of all the shortcomings of GATT/WTO tribunals as a forum for trade and environment disputes, it is 
useful at this point to emphasize the importance and viability of UNCLOS as another international forum for 
such cases. The argument for resorting to UNCLOS tribunals has more fully been addressed177 and those 
conclusions will only briefly be asserted here. Importantly, within key areas of potential conflict, the 
substantive international environmental obligations and the dispute settlement procedures of UNCLOS 
countervail GATT/WTO. UNCLOS not only incorporates substantive principles of IEL, it also creates a binding 
system of adjudication and dispute resolution that confers upon its legal forums the jurisdiction and 
adjudicatory authority to hear trade and environment [30 ELR 10275] disputes. Additionally, even where 
States are not parties to UNCLOS, but nevertheless accept its provisions as codifications of customary IEL, the 
ICJ is in a position to adjudicate trade and environment disputes in limited circumstances. 
 
The countervailing jurisdiction of UNCLOS in trade environment disputes could raise some concerns and even 
give rise to the specter of judicial uncertainty resulting from competing jurisdiction between two lawfully 
constituted international tribunals. First, might there be a race to the most favorable courthouse? Second, 
what of the confusion and uncertainty resulting from two tribunals exercising jurisdiction over the same case? 
Third, might the absence of established rules of international law governing clashes between tribunals 
asserting concurrent jurisdiction lead to a form of judicial anarchy in which UNCLOS and WTO tribunals joust 
with each other for judicial supremacy? Finally, how might conflicting orders of these tribunals be 
implemented or enforced? 
 
The question of competing jurisdiction amongst tribunals established by treaties (intergovernmental tribunals) 
has not hitherto been addressed by treaty or customary law.178 In the absence of treaty or customary norms 
governing how international tribunals should act, two other sources of public international law, "general 
principles of law," and "judicial decisions . . . of the various nations,"179 must be examined. There is no doubt 
that "general principles of law" enjoy parity of legal status, albeit not of importance, with treaties and custom, 
as primary sources of international law. The Statute of the ICJ underscored the primary status of "general 
principles" by characterizing the other sources of international law: "judicial decisions," and the "teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists" as "subsidiary" means for determining the rules of law.180 
 
The general principles of law referred to can be adopted or derived from conflict of laws (Conflicts) 
jurisprudence dealing with jurisdiction among the domestic (national) courts of various countries. There are 
two primary principles that can be determined from Conflicts theory dealing with issues of conflicting 
jurisdiction: reasonableness and fairness.181 These foundational principles are also articulated through other 
more specific supplemental principles such as forum non conveniens, comity, and choice of law. 
 
Conflicts analysis also divides a court's jurisdiction into two inquiries: legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction,182 
and judicial jurisdiction.183 If we adopt this structural analysis, the primary and supplemental general 
principles of law deriving therefrom may be applied to the potential jurisdictional clash between the 
GATT/WTO and UNCLOS. The conclusion is that the application of these general principles of law and the 
judicial decisions of the various countries justifies the assertion of both legislative and judicial jurisdiction by 
UNCLOS tribunals. 
 
The Conflicts experience in analogous cases also demonstrates that many of the fears articulated by a 
potential clash between the GATT/WTO and UNCLOS are unfounded, and that conflicting jurisdiction does not 
give rise to judicial anarchy. Domestic courts in different countries have arrived at a functional and legal 
understanding and accommodation of each other's concurrent jurisdiction, and have attempted to resolve 
conflicts on the basis of legal principle rather than arbitrary caprice.184 
 
The answers to questions relating to the legislative and judicial jurisprudence of the GATT/WTO and UNCLOS 
all assume a further foundational premise: that both forums are engaged in the common pursuit of justice 
rather than of judicial hegemony. If this premise is correct, the existence of UNCLOS as an alternate forum to 
challenge the hitherto untouched monopoly of the GATT/WTO in trade and environment disputes might 
generate genuine reform within the latter body. Reform would both advance international comity by 




The US-Shrimp case is only the latest in a line of decisions made by GATT/WTO tribunals that have made 
significant inroads into the reserve domain of the United States. The case demonstrates, moreover, how an 
unsympathetic tribunal that does not recognize IEL can thwart environmental protection. The dominance of 
trade law to the exclusion of environmental law can pressurize States into surrendering or subjugating 
environmental objectives in order to advance their trade and economic interests. Countries such as the United 
States could become persuaded that the best way to promote important economic issues such as the export 
of beef into Europe or the removal of trade barriers in Japan, is by jettisoning the protection of the 
environment. This might explain the admissions by the United States in the US-Shrimp case. 
 
Such a dilemma could be avoided by confining GATT/WTO adjudication to trade disputes alone, while referring 
trade and environmental cases to a tribunal under UNCLOS that applies both international trade and 
environmental law. The prosecution of environmental objectives in UNCLOS should be handled by 
environmental not trade agencies. Doing so would prevent trade representatives, who are not usually 
committed to environmental protection, from readily conceding environmental objectives in exchange for 
other favors, as they might have done in the US-Shrimp case in the GATT/WTO. 
 
While the need for impartial legal forums that can decide trade and environment disputes is met by UNCLOS 
tribunals, one major barrier confronts the United States. It has not ratified UNCLOS and is thereby prevented 
from accessing [30 ELR 10276] UNCLOS tribunals. In the circumstances, it has become increasingly evident that 
the problems encountered in the GATT/WTO provide another powerful reason as to why the United States 
should ratify UNCLOS. Those who have objected to UNCLOS because of the alleged loss of sovereignty must 
now recognize that the boot is on the other foot. The GATT/WTO has encroached on the sovereignty of the 
United States, and UNCLOS gives the United States an opportunity to regain its sovereignty, and recoup some 
of the ground lost to the GATT/WTO. 
 
From a political standpoint, it is conceivable that the presence of another forum challenging its judicial 
monopoly might produce genuine reforms within the GATT/WTO and lead to the recognition and 
accommodation of IEL. The reformation of the GATT/WTO to include IEL would, of course, obviate the need 
for taking trade environment disputes to another tribunal. It is, however, difficult to believe that the 
GATT/WTO will reform itself in the absence of competing UNCLOS jurisdiction. Political reality requires that 
the GATT/WTO be countervailed by UNCLOS. 
 
1. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 118, 121 (1999) (adopted Nov. 6, 
1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report]. The Report of the Appellate Body is to be distinguished 
from the Panel Report of the same case. See World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report on United States-
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, May 15, 1998, WT/DS58/R, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 
832 (1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp Panel Report]. 
 
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was implemented in 1947. See generally General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (annexed to the Final Act 
Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended, or modified) [hereinafter GATT 
1947]. GATT 1947 was further modified, supplemented, and adopted as Annex 1A of the World Trade 
Organization Charter [hereinafter GATT 1994]. The World Trade Organization was establishedby the Uruguay 
Round negotiations in 1994. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 
3. See United States Mission to Australia, East Asia and Pacific Edition of the Daily Washington File, Statement 
by Ambassador Rita D. Hayes on the Adoption of the Appellate Body Report in the Shrimp-Turtle Dispute 
(visited Jan. 11, 2000) http://www.usis-australia.gov/hyper/WF981106/epf509.htm [hereinafter Statement on 
Adoption]. 
 
4. See Jay Mazur, Labor's New Internationalism, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 79. 
 
5. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542 (1988). 
 
6. See Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (last modified Feb. 1, 2000) 
http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm. For a description of the dispute settlement process within the 
WTO, see WTO, Settling Disputes (visited Feb. 10, 2000) http://www.wto.org/wto/about/dispute 1 .htm. 
 
7. See infra notes 141-65 and accompanying text. 
 
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 
9. See Kathleen D. Yaninek, Turtle Excluder Device Regulations: Laws Sea Turtles Can Live With, 21 N.C. CENT. 
L.J. 256, 290-91 (1995). See also Todd Steiner, Sea Turtles, Shrimp Fisheries & the Turtle Excluder Device 
(visited Nov. 24, 1999) http://www.earthsummitwatch.org/shrimp/positions/pov2.html. 
 
10. Ted Williams, The Exclusion of Sea Turtles, AUDUBON, Jan. 1990, at 26. 
 
11. Paul S. Kibel, Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the Court of International Trade, 15 UCLA 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 57 (1996-1997). 
 
12. See Corinne Sam, World Trade Organization Caught in the Middle: Are TEDs the Only Way Out?, 29 ENVTL. 
L. 185, 191-92 (1999). 
 
13. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECLINE OF THE SEA TURTLES: 
CAUSES AND PREVENTION 16 (1990). 
 
14. Selina S. Heppell et al., Models to Evaluate Headstarting as a Management Tool for Long-Lived Turtles, 6 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 556, 557 (1996). 
 




17. TEDs are panels of large mesh webbings or metal grids inserted into shrimp nets. As the nets are dragged 
along, shrimp and small sea creatures pass through the TED and are collected while other marine animals too 
large to fit through the panel, like sea turtles, are deflected out of the net by an escape hatch. Jack Rudloe & 
Anne Rudloe, Shrimpers and Lawmakers Collide Over a Move to Save the Sea Turtles, SMITHSONIAN, Dec. 
1989, at 45. See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 128. 
 
18. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 127-28. 
 
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, ELR STAT. ESA §§ 2-18. 
 
20. Id. See also Yaninek, supra note 9, at 259-63 (describing the physical features and marine patterns of each 
of the six species). 
 
21. See Yaninek, supra note 9, at 268-70 (tracing the history of National Marine Fisheries Service studies on 
sea turtles and the threat posed by shrimp harvesting). 
 
22. See Pub. L. No. 100-478, tit. I, § 1008, 102 Stat. 2306, 2309-12 (1988). 
 
23. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 74-75. See also Public Review of the National 
Academy of Sciences Report on the Decline of Sea Turtles—Causes and Prevention, 55 Fed. Reg. 23259 (1990). 
 
24. Pub. L. No. 101-162, tit. VI, § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38 (1989) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 
1537 (West Supp. 1999). 
 
25. Id. § 609(a). 
 
26. Id. § 609(b). 
 
27. In February 1997, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO established Panels pursuant to the 
request of Malaysia, Thailand, and Pakistan regarding Section 609's importation ban. In April 1997, the DSB 
established a Panel in accordance with a request made by India and consolidated this Panel with the Panel 
already established. See US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 1, paras. 1-2. 
 
28. Article I:1 of GATT 1994 outlines the most favored nation treatment obligation of GATT. Article XI:1 of 
GATT 1994 provides for the general elimination of quantitative restrictions imposed by any GATT party on the 
importation of any product from the territory of another GATT party or on the exportation or sale for export 
of any product destined for another GATT party. Article XIII:1 of GATT 1994 prohibits the discriminatory 
administration of quantitative restrictions. See GATT 1994, supra note 2. 
 
29. See US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 1, para. 27. Article XX of GATT 1994 is a provision permitting 
measures adopted by a GATT/WTO Member State that would otherwise be GATT-illegal if the measure 
satisfies the requirements of one of the enumerated exceptions in Article XX as well as the requirements of 
the chapeau or preambular provision of Article XX. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
 
30. See US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 1, para. 27. 
 
31. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, para 187. 
 
32. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 






35. See Judith H. Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 
(1996) (asserting that the WTO relies on voluntary compliance and that any WTO member may exercise its 
sovereignty and take action inconsistent with the WTO agreement, provided that compensation is afforded to 
adversely affected trading partners or that offsetting retaliation is permitted). See also Antonio F. Perez, WTO 
and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 306 (1998) (discussing the 
competing conceptions of the WTO legal order as either an international or supranational organization in the 
context of national security interests exceptions). 
 
36. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 32, at 289. 
 
37. WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
arts. 16, 17(14), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
 
38. Id. art. 3(2). 
 
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (entered 
into force Jan. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Many provisions of the Vienna Convention are 
widely viewed as restatements of the customary international rules governing treaties. See I LASSA 
OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1199 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
 
40. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1949, art. 38, annexed to U.N. Charter, 59 Stat. 
1055 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ]. 
 
41. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 690 (5th ed. 1998). Declaration of Principles 
on International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the 
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 
(1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970). The important, albeit not immutable, extent of the domestic 
jurisdiction or the "reserved domain" of States was emphasized by the well known dictum of the Permanent 
Court of Justice (PCIJ) that "whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an 
essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international relations." Nationality Decrees 
Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24. 
 
42. BROWNLIE, supra note 41, at 71. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] ("Under international law, a State is an 
entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and 
that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with such other entities."). 
 
43. 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). This case involved the collision of a French ship with a Turkish ship on 
the high seas near Turkey, resulting in the death of Turkish nationals. Turkish officials then commenced 
criminal proceedings against the French watch officer for his supposed role in the collision. France claimed 
that this criminal prosecution violated international law. The PCIJ found that because no international rules 
covered such a situation, Turkey's assertion of jurisdiction in instituting criminal proceedings against the 
French officer did not violate international law. 
 
44. The importance of the Lotus principle, upholding the freedom and independence of States as a source and 
expression of international law and judicial reasoning is discussed in HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION 
OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, 94-96 (1966). See also Celia R. Taylor, A Modest Proposal: 
Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global Age, U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 745, 762-64 (1997) (discussing the concept 
of a State's autonomy as an "exercise" of sovereignty inherent in statehood). 
 
45. BROWNLIE, supra note 41, at 293. See also Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, reprinted in 
[1949] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 286, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1949. 
 
46. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 29 (3d ed. 1976). Interpretative principles in international law specifically address the recognition 
of state sovereignty in interpreting treaties. In cases where the basic rule of interpretation in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention either has or has not established a clear and reasonable meaning, Article 32 allows 
recourse to supplementary means of interpretation for purposes of either confirmation or aid. One such 
supplementary means of interpretation is the principle of in dubio mitius, in deference to sovereignty of 
States. When a term's meaning is ambiguous, "that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the 
party assuming an obligation, or which interferes [sic] less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a 
party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties." OPPENHEIM, supra note 39, at 1278. Since 
GATT/WTO treaties are subject to the customary international rules of interpretation, the above 
supplementary rule of interpretation would apply. It is noteworthy in this regard that GATT/WTO treaties 
make no express mention of any derogation of State sovereignty in the area of treaty making. 
 
47. BROWNLIE, supra note 41, at 293. 
 
48. For example, Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations prevents the United Nations from 
intervening in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, but specifically affirms 
in the same subsection that "this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII." 
 
49. Absent this guiding principle, the expansion of trade law into the area of environmental protection could 
give the WTO sovereign control over vital questions of domestic policy such as the conduct of foreign 
relations. See Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization: Lessons From 
the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 775, 792-93 (1999) (summarizing the debate over 
issues of sovereignty between proponents and opponents of the dispute settlement process of theWTO). The 
Appellate Body's ruling clearly signals the encroachment of the WTO into the sovereignty of the United States. 
 
50. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 22 (1964). 
 
51. See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to 
National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 212 (1996) (proposing that there is an important policy value in 
recognizing the need for some deference to national government decisions in GATT/WTO's dispute settlement 
process). 
 
52. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 1A, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 






55. See Ministerial Decision on the Review of Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS—THE LEGAL TEXTS 453 (1995). 
 
56. GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. X:3(b) (emphasis added). 
 
57. Croley & Jackson, supra note 51, at 212. 
 
58. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, para. 159. According to the Appellate Body, "the task of 
interpreting and applying the chapeau is . . . essentially . . . one of locating and marking out a line of 
equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other 
Members under varying substantive provisions . . . of the GATT 1994." Id. 
 
59. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 23 ELR 21553 (9th Cir. 1993); Earth Island Inst. v. 
Christopher, 890 F. Supp. 1085 (C.I.T. 1995); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 1995 WL 604708 (C.I.T. 1995); 
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (C.I.T. 1995), appeal dismissed, 86 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (C.I.T. 1996); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 
597, 27 ELR 20408 (C.I.T. 1996), vacated, Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352, 28 ELR 21421 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. 1062 (C.I.T. 1996), vacated, Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 
147 F.3d 1352, 28 ELR 21421 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.I.T. 1999). 
 
60. See Earth Island Inst., 6 F.3d at 648, 23 ELR at 21553. 
 
61. Id. at 652, 23 ELR at 21554-55. 
 
62. Id. at 651, 23 ELR at 21554. 
 
63. 890 F. Supp. 1085 (C.I.T. 1995). 
 
64. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596, available in ELR STAT. ADMIN. PROC. 
 
65. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, para. 187. 
 
66. GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. XX(g). 
 
67. Id. art. XX. The Appellate Body's analysis of Article XX of GATT 1994 is thus two tiered. First, a measure 
must be provisionally justified by reason of its characterization under one of the enumerated exceptions listed 
in Article XX. Second, the same measure must be appraised further under the chapeau or introductory clause 
of Article XX to be fully justified. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, para. 118. 
 
68. US-ShrimpAppellate Body Report, supra note 1, para. 184. 
 
69. Id. para. 166. 
 
70. Id. para. 167. 
 
71. Id. para. 172. 
 
72. See First Submission of the United States, World Trade Organization Panel on United States—Import 
Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 9-10 (June 9, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. Panel Submission]. 
 
73. Id. at 11. 
 
74. US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 1, para. 7.56. 
 
75. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, para. 172. 
 
76. In its appraisal of whether Section 609 was applied in a manner constituting "unjustifiable discrimination," 
the Appellate Body listed several aspects that were then considered in their cumulative effect. First, the 
Appellate Body determined that the exclusiveness of the language in the 1996 Guidelines promulgated by the 
Department of State, see Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for 
the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed. Reg. 17342 (Apr. 19, 1996), eliminated 
flexibility in the determination of comparability under Section 609. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra 
note 1, paras. 161-165. A second aspect considered by the Appellate Body was "the failure of the United 
States to engage the appellees, as well as other Members exporting shrimp to the United States, in serious, 
across-the-board negotiations. . . ." Id. para. 166. Third, the Appellate Body found that the application of 
Section 609 resulted in differential treatment among various countries because of different "phase-in" periods 
for the adjustment to the use of TED's on shrimp trawling vessels. Id. para. 173. 
 






80. Id. para. 181. 
 
81. Id. para. 182. 
 
82. See supra note 76. 
 
83. Letter from Justice Samuel F. Miller to John F. Dillon (Nov. 16, 1885) (quoted in JOHN DILLON, THE LAWS 
AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 263 (1895)). 
 
84. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 32, at 318. 
 
85. See A.L. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117, 119 (1959) (stating that the ratio 
decidendi of a case may be deduced by identifying the facts treated as material by the judge). 
 
86. See EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES (2d ed. 1894). Wambaugh advances that the doctrine of a 
case may be discovered by "ascertaining the proposition of law for which a decision is authority." Id. at 8. 
 
87. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652, 23 ELR 21553, 21554 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 
88. Croley & Jackson, supra note 51, at 212. 
 
89. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, para. 159 ("The task of interpreting and applying the 
chapeau is . . . essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right 
of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying 
substantive provisions . . . ."). 
 
90. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 890 F. Supp. 1085, 1091-92 (C.I.T. 1995). 
 
91. Earth Island Inst., 6 F.3d at 651-52, 23 ELR at 21554-55. 
 
92. See 56 Fed. Reg. 1051 (Jan. 10, 1991); 58 Fed. Reg. 9015 (Feb. 18, 1993); 61 Fed. Reg. 17342 (Apr. 19, 
1996). Such exemption from the rulemaking procedures of the APA is provided by the § 553(a) exception for 
the involvement of a "foreign affairs function of the United States. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a). 
 
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 706, available in ELR STAT. ADMIN. PROC. 
 
94. See id. § 702, available in ELR STAT. ADMIN. PROC. 
 
95. See Earth Island Inst., 6 F.3d at 653-54, 23 ELR at 21555-56. The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce Section 
609(a), which they described as a nonjusticiable statute that directs the conduct of foreign relations. Since 
Section 609(a) orders the Executive Branch to negotiate and enter into treaties, the court ruled that it "[could] 
not lawfully order the Executive to comply with the terms of a statute that impinges upon power exclusively 
granted to the Executive Branch under the Constitution." Id. at 653, 23 ELR at 21555. Therefore, since the 
plaintiffs in this case could not seek enforcement of Section 609 compelling the Executive Branch to initiate 
negotiations for the conservation of sea turtles, a fair reading of the doctrine would mean that foreign 
countries would similarly be foreclosed from asking for judicial enforcement of Section 609(a). Hence, any 
judicial review of Section 609 would be limited to the subsections of Section 609(b). 
 
96. 5 U.S.C. § 701, available in ELR STAT. ADMIN. PROC. 
 
97. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 1 ELR 20110 (1971). See also Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). 
 
98. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 890 F. Supp. 1085, 1091-92 (C.I.T. 1995). 
 
99. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945). 
 
100. GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. X:1. 
 
101. Id. art. X:3(a). 
 
102. Id. art. X:3(b). 
 
103. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 575 (C.I.T. 1995), appeal dismissed, 86 F.3d 1178 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 
104. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (C.I.T. 1996). This request for a one-year extension 
of time for enforcement of Section 609 and denial thereof by the CIT was filed as a motion for "modification" 
resulting from the CIT's decision requiring world-wide enforcement of Section 609. 
 
105. Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of 
Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed. Reg. 17342 (Apr. 19, 1996). 
 
106. Id. at 17343. 
 
107. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597, 27 ELR 20408 (C.I.T. 1996). 
 
108. Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352, 1356, 28 ELR 21421, 21423 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The basis for the 
order of the court of appeals was that Earth Island Institute by withdrawing beforehand the motion that led to 
the additional relief granted by the CIT had thereby deprived that court of jurisdiction. 
 
109. Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Sea 
Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 46094 (Aug. 28, 1998). 
 
110. Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.I.T. 1999). The court decided on April 4, 1999, that the 
unambiguous language of Section 609 would not allow the importation of TED-caught shrimp from uncertified 
nations. However, the CIT declared it would delay entrance of a judgment until after the filing of the annual 
report to Congress required by Section 609(b)(2) and any responses received from prior notices of proposed 
revisions to guidelines for the implementation of Section 609. Id. at 1081. In July 1999, another set of Revised 
Guidelines were published, see Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-
162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36946 (July 8, 
1999), in response to recommendations made by the DSB of the WTO. The July 1999 Guidelines essentially 
reenact the 1998 Guidelines. They remain, therefore, in violation of the language of Section 609, as 
determined by the CIT. 
 
111. Earth Island Inst., 48 F. Supp. 2d at 1069. 
 
112. See Submission of the United States Before the World Trade Organization Appellate Body, United States-
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (July 23, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. Appellate 
Submission]. 
 






116. Id. para. 181. The appellate submission of the United States before the Appellate Body did not discuss the 
issue of judicial review of the certification provisions of Section 609. See U.S. Appellate Submission, supra note 
112. 
 
117. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, para. 183. 
 
118. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 890 F. Supp. 1085, 1091-92 (C.I.T. 1995). 
 
119. See Statement on Adoption, supra note 3. 
 
120. See Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the 
Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36946 (July 8, 1999). The United 
States also entered into an agreement with the complainants by which it agreed to comply with the decision 
of the Appellate Body by December 6, 1999. See WTO Sets Up Dispute Panel on United States Antidumping 
Act of 1916, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 192 (Feb. 3, 1999). 
 
121. Organizations which have environmental functions include the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Education, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP), and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This 
partial list exemplifies the fractured nature of international organizations exercising splintered oversight over 
fragmented areas of IEL. 
 
122. None of the organizations referred to possess a compulsory system of dispute settlement or an 
overarching institutional body such as the WTO. The mission of UNEP, the most overtly environmental 
organization amongst them, is to persuade and convince States of the need for action by providing 
information, expertise, and advice. It does not, however, enjoy any executive or judicial powers. 
 
123. The arguments summarized here are more fully delineated in Lakshman Guruswamy, The Promise of 
UNCLOS: Justice in Trade and Environment Disputes, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189 (1998); and Lakshman Guruswamy, 
Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO Decide Trade and Environment Disputes?, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 287 
(1998). This Article is intended to supplement and extend the arguments made in those two articles, and 
reproduces parts of those articles. 
 
124. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 293(1). 
 
125. See DSU, supra note 37, art. 3(2) (stating "the Members recognize that [the dispute settlement system of 
the WTO] serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements . . ."). 
 
126. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994). Article 5(5.7) stipulates "subject to the 
provisions in the lead-in to paragraph 6, where urgent problems of . . . environmental protection . . . arise or 
threaten to arise for a Member, that Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in paragraph 6 as it 
finds necessary . . . ." Id. Additionally, in order to invoke this exception, the Member must comply with certain 
other requirements listed in Article 5(5.7). 
 
127. See DSU, supra note 37, art. 3(4): ("Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at 
achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this 
Understanding and under the covered agreements.") (emphasis added). See also id. art. 3(5): ("All solutions . . 
. shall be consistent with those agreements, and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member 
under those agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements.") (emphasis 
added). Article 7 of the DSU deals with the terms of reference of Panels and confines them to "the relevant 
provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute." Id. art. 7(2). Article 11 
of the DSU deals with the functions of panels and requires them to assess the "applicability of and conformity 
with the relevant covered agreements." Id. art. 11. It does not refer to any other laws or principles. 
 
128. Id. art. 3(2). It states conclusively that "recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements" (emphasis added). 
 
129. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 311. 
 
130. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2. The preamble states, in part, "the Parties to this Agreement . . . seek[] 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent 
with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development." 
 
131. GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, Doc. 1529, reprinted in 4 WORLD TRADE MATERIALS 37 
(1992) [hereinafter GATT Secretariat]. According to the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), pollution 
increases at the early stage of economic development but decreases after a certain income level has been 
reached. This results in a turn around of the curve that takes on the shape of an inverted "U." See also WTO 
Secretariat, Special Studies 4: Trade and Environment (Oct. 14, 1999). 
 
132. WTO Press Release, Trade Liberalization Reinforces the Need for Environmental Cooperation (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2000) http://www.wto.org/wto/new/press140.htm. 
 




135. See id. 
 
136. GATT Secretariat, supra note 131, at 18. 
 
137. See generally GATT 1994, supra note 2, arts. III & XI. 
 




140. See generally 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, at 57-174 (Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, 
NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 236-44 (1997); Thomas J. 
Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for 
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 269, 273-80 & passim (1997); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and 
Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1239-42 (1992); Cynthia M. 
Mass, Should the WTO Expand GATT Article XX?: An Analysis of United States—Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 381, 426-27 (1996); Chris Wold, Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 854-61 (1996); Charles 
R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GATT and Multilateral Environmental Agreements Within the 
Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 341, 352-57 (1996); Kazumochi Kometani, Trade and 
Environment: How Should WTO Panels Review Environmental Regulations Under GATT Articles III and XX?, 16 
NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 441, 466-76 (1996); Paul J. Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilities for GATT—
Compliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247, 255-57, 264-68 (1996). 
 
141. GATT Dispute Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 
155 (1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (unadopted) [hereinafter US-Tuna I]. 
 
142. GATT Dispute Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 16, 1994, GATT Doc. 
DS29/R, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (unadopted) [hereinafter US-Tuna II]. 
 
143. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, Apr. 29, 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) (adopted May 20, 1996) 
[hereinafter US-Gasoline Appeal]. This is to be distinguished from the Panel Report of the same case. See 
World Trade Organization Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, Jan. 29, 1996, WT/DS2/R, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) [hereinafter US-Gasoline Panel Report]. 
As the Appellate Body Report modified the Panel Report, the two should be read in conjunction for this case. 
 
144. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h, ELR STAT. MMPA §§ 2-409. 
 
145. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade With Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We 
Prosper and Protect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1411, 1415-33 (1992). 
 
146. US-Tuna II, supra note 142, para. 2.12. 
 
147. Id. para. 5.27. 
 
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, ELR STAT. CAA §§ 101-618. 
 
149. The Panel Report noted that the Panel's task was to ensure that the provisions and objectives of the GATT 
were maintained notwithstanding the desirability or necessity of the environmental objectives of the 
proposed legislation in dispute. See US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 143, para. 7.1. In this case 
Venezuela was protesting the U.S. restrictions on the importation by the United States of reformulated 
gasoline. Venezuela successfully claimed that the CAA was discriminatory because it forced foreign producers 
to meet U.S. refinery industry averages. Id. para. 6.15. 
 
150. US-Gasoline Appeal, supra note 143, at 30. 
 
151. There would, of course, be no problem if the multilateral treaties included all GATT parties and were (1) 
entered into subsequent to the GATT, or (2) seen as a "lex specialis"—a specialist treaty. In both cases such 
multilateral treaties would trump the GATT. See US-Tuna II, supra note 142, para. 3.41. 
 
152. In US-Tuna II, the EU and the Netherlands successfully initiated GATT proceedings against the United 
States similar to Mexico's suit against the United States in US-Tuna I. The EU claimed that the U.S. 
intermediary ban on indirect imports of tuna was hurting European fishing industries. The WTO Panel 
concluded that "measures taken so as to force other countries to change their policies, and that were effective 
only if such changes occurred, could not be primarily aimed either at . . . rendering effective restriction on 
domestic production or consumption." Id. para. 5.27. 
 
153. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 
1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975). 
 




156. The United States relied on Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
 
157. US-Tuna II, supra note 142, para. 5.19. 
 
158. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. 
 
159. Any attempt to draw support for such a proposition from the US-Tuna II decision would be to 
misconstrue it. In light of that Panel's holding that it is not open to a country to take unilateral measures that 
force or cajole others into changing their domestic environmental policies, it is a possible interpretation that 
such changes may be made by treaty. Consequently, action taken under treaty to implement agreed changes 
of domestic behavior might be justified under the GATT/WTO. However, as we have seen, the Panel dispelled 
any such implication when it held that environmental treaties like CITES, that did not include all GATT parties, 
were irrelevant. 
 
160. This happened in US-Tuna II, where the panel stated that U.S. measures to protect dolphin life or health 
were not necessary because it failed a proportionality test which requires the use of reasonable alternative 
measures not inconsistent with the GATT. See US-Tuna II, supra note 142, paras. 5.34-5.39. In the US-Gasoline 
Panel Report, the United States argued that the nondegradation requirements of the CAA were "necessary to 
protect human, animal and plant life or health." US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 143, para. 3.40. 
However, the WTO Panel, while noting that gasoline emissions are tied to human health, was more impressed 
by its finding that imported gasoline was accorded different treatment than U.S. gasoline, and held that the 
measures taken were not "necessary" to protect human, animal, or plant life or health. See id. para. 6.29. On 
appeal, the Appellate Body did not deem it necessary to address this question in light of its ruling that the 
United States had not satisfied the requirements of the "chapeau" or introductory clauses of Article XX by 
taking actions that constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised restriction" on international 
trade. 
 
161. US-Tuna II, supra note 142, para. 5.26. 
 
162. US-Gasoline Appeal, supra note 143, at 19. See also US-Tuna II, supra note 142, paras. 3.52-3.53. 
 
163. The Appellate Body in US-Gasoline Appeal freely dismissed the difficulties facing the EPA in collecting 
evidence from foreign countries in order to give foreign refineries individual baselines. See US-Gasoline 
Appeal, supra note 143, at 28. There is recognition within trade circles of this problem. See generally Croley & 
Jackson, supra note 51, at 194. Unfortunately, these two distinguished authors come to the curious conclusion 
that a GATT tribunal cannot be compared to a court or judicial forum reviewing administrative or executive 
actions in domestic law. Such a conclusion is at variance with the fundamental assumptions underlying any 
allocation of power in an undeveloped international legal order lacking compulsory jurisdiction. Where 
sovereign States allocate limited power to a functional international tribunal under the GATT/WTO, such 
tribunals ought to be very sensitive to the demarcation of powers between sovereign States and international 
organizations. This should lead to greater, not less deference to national decisionmaking. 
 
164. US-Tuna I, supra note 141, at para. 5.11. 
 
165. US-Gasoline Appeal, supra note 143, at 29-30. 
 
166. See DSU, supra note 37, art. 8.1. 
 




169. Apart from judicial interpretation, Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement allows for "interpretation" that 
does not "undermine the amendment provisions of Art. X" provided it is agreed to by three quarters of the 
parties. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. IX:2. However, the required three quarters majority renders 
this kind of interpretation impracticable, while any interpretation given is open to legal challenge as 
amounting to an amendment. See Michael Lennard, The World Trade Organization and Disputes Involving 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 5 EUR. ENV'T L. REV. 306, 310 (1996). 
 
170. See HERBERT HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-25 (1961). 
 
171. See generally WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 
AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1923). 
 
172. See generally Neil MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, 90 LAW Q. REV. 102, 106-07 (1974). 
 
173. See Vienna Convention, supra note 39, arts. 31-32. 
 
174. Id. art. 31(1). 
 
175. See id. art. 31(3)(c). The Appellate Body in the US-Gasoline Appeal paid pro forma respect to Article 3(2) 
of the DSU and to the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention which it correctly identified as forming 
part of customary law. Having suggested that the GATT/WTO is not to be read in "clinical isolation from public 
international law," it could not, however, escape the predicament that all its decisions should be subject to the 
GATT and the Covered Agreements. US-Gasoline Appeal, supra note 143, at 17. 
 
176. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 40, art. 38. 
 
177. See generally Guruswamy, Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO Decide Trade and Environment Disputes?, 
supra note 123. 
 
178. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 42, § 403. 
 
179. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 40, art. 38(c)-(d). 
 
180. Id. art. 38(d). 
 
181. According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, reasonableness is 
a rule of customary international law applicable to domestic courts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 
42, § 403 cmt. a. While both principles enjoy the status of custom, they also qualify as cardinal general 
principles of law applicable to intergovernmental tribunals. 
 
182. Legislative jurisdiction refers to whether a tribunal possesses the jurisdiction, power, or right to entertain 
the dispute. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 1 (3d ed. 1996). 
 
183. Judicial jurisdiction asks whether a tribunal that possesses legislative jurisdiction should exercise that 
jurisdiction. See id. at 1-5. 
 
184. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR 
REASONABLENESS (1996). Lowenfeld offers numerous cases supporting his thesis that there is an emerging 
consensus about the criteria employed in asserting both legislative and judicial jurisdiction. He argues that 
these cases display a confluence between national and international criteria based on fairness and 
reasonableness. 
 
30 ELR 10261 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 2000 | All rights reserved 
 
 
